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CASE NOTES
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW - Due Process - Intentional Admis.
sion of Perjured Testimony. - The petitioner relied on Texas statutes
treating killing under influence of sudden passion arising from ade-
quate cause as murder without malice. Vernon's Tex. Pen. Code,
1948, Arts. 1257a, 1257b, 12 57 c. A witness for the state gave testimony
which the prosecutor knew was perjured and which seriously pre-
judiced petitioner's reliance on the statutes. The jury found petitioner
guilty of murder with malice and imposed the death penalty. The
court of criminal appeals affirmed. Shortly thereafter the witness
made a sworn statement that he had given false testimony at the
trial. Petitioner sought a writ of habeas corpus but the trial court
refused and the appellate court affirmed. The United States Supreme
Court granted certiorari. HELD: reversed and remanded. The peti-
tioner was denied due process of law, for the introduction of perjured
testimony tended squarely to refute his claim that he had adequate
cause for sudden passion. Alcorta v. Texas, 355 U. S. 28 (1957).
The basic elements comprising due process of law under the four-
teenth amendment are notice and hearing, Hovey v. Elliott, 167 U. S.
409 (1897); Roller v. Holly, 176 U. S. 398 (1900), and a legally
competent tribunal having jurisdiction of the case. Pennoyer v. Neff,
95 U. S. 714 (1878) ; Scott v'. McNeal, 154 U. S. 34 (1894). Despite
the early reluctance of the Court to invade the province of state
crininal procedure, Hurtado v. California, 110 U. S. 516 (1884);
Frank v. Mangum, 237 U. S. 309 (1915), certain minimum require-
ments evolved to bring state criminal procedure in conformity with
"the fundamental principles of liberty and justice which lie at the
base of all our civil and political institutions." Herbert v. Louisiana,
272 U. S. 312 (1926). By application of this rather indefinite stand-
ard, mob domination of a trial, Moore v. Dempsey, 261 U. S. 86
(1923) ; cf., Frank v. Mangunt, supra: a partial judge with a pecuni-
ary interest, Tumey v. Ohio, 273 U. S. 510 (1927) ; denial of counsel,
Powell v. Alabama, 287 U. S. 45 (1932); and failure to allow for
adequate preparation for trial, Powell v. Alabama, ibid., were all held
to be violations of due process. The prohibition's and guaranties of
the fourteenth amendment are addressed to and control not only
the states, but also every person, natural or judicial, who is the re-
pository of state power. Home Telephone & Telegraph Co. v. Los
Angeles, 227 U. S. 278 (1913). Acts of state officers that have been
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struck down include racial discrimination of jurors, Neal v. Delaware,
103 U. S. 70 (1881); Rogers v. Alabama, 192 U. S. 226 (1904);
coerced confessions, Brown v. Mississippi, 297 U. S. 278 (1936);
use of false testimony extorted by violence and torture, Hyslon v.
Florida, 315 U. S. 411 (1932) ; prosecutor's fraudulent preparation of
transcript of trial proceedings ultimately to be presented to highest
state court, Chessman v. Teets, 350 U. S. 45 (1955) ; and a fraudulent
trial and wrongful conviction by reason of a conspiracy designed to
that end and carried out by state officials. McShane v. Moldovan,
172 F. 2d 1016 (6th Cir. 1949). Deliberate suppression by prosecutor
of evidence favorable to a defendant, U. S. v. Rutkin, 212 F. 2d 641
(3rd Cir. 1954), or material to issues of guilt or penalty, U. S. ex rel.
Thompson v. Dye, 221 F. 2d 763 (3rd Cir. 1955). The intentional
admission of perjured testimony violates due process. Mooney v.
Holohan, 294 U. S. 103 (1935); Pyle v. Kansas, 317 U. S. 213
(1942); White v. Ragen, 324 U. S. 760 (1945). See ANNOT, 2
L. Ed. 2d 1575 (1958).
The use of perjured testimony is equally as revolting to the tradi-
tional concept of justice as mob domination of a trial, denial of counsel,
coerced confessions, or any of the other repudiated violations and is
tantamount to a conviction based on no evidence. No circumstances
should require one to prejudice the right of a defendant to a fair
trial in eagerness to secure a conviction. Even though a defendant
is guilty he is still entitled to due process. Rochin v. California, 342
U. S. 165 (1952). Although the law is well settled with reference
to the intentional use of perjured testimony, the recurrence of the
problem merits an inquiry into the duties of the office of prosecuting
attorney. Does the prosecutor have a duty to disclose all evidence
favorable to a defendant even though prosecutor personally doubts
the truth of such evidence? The constitutional duty of the prosecutor
pervades the whole issue. QUERY, is non-feasance of a prosecutor
as constitutionally invalid as malfeasance? An affirmative answer
would seem to be in accord with the evolution of decisions giving
vitality to the due process clause as a bulwark of life and liberty
against local injustice.
CHARLES RIcE.
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CONSTITUTIONAL LAW - Separation of Powers - No Pro-
vision for Review by Court of Findings of Fact by Administrative
Agency. - In 1957 the legislature of New Mexico passed a compul-
sory workmen's compensation act which encompassed all employers
hiring four or more workers in extra hazardous occupations and all
employees whose employers had voluntarily submitted to the pro-
visions of the legislation. The act replaced the courts as prescribed
in the existing statute and provided for the establishment of a com-
mission to hear compensation cases, decide questions of fact and
make conclusions of law which would -have the force and effect of
judgments when filed, if supported by substantial evidence. Appeal
to the District Courts for review of findings of law was to be available,
but no provision was made for a review of findings of fact. Subsequent
to the passage of this act, on the relation of a concrete manufacturing
company and two insurance companies, the State obtained a writ of
mandamus to compel the governor to appoint a commission in compli-
ance with the act, the governor not having done so because he doubted
its validity. HELD 3-2: The act is unconstitutional. The failure to
provide for a review of findings of fact constitutes a usurpation of
powers inherent in the judiciary and hence is banned by the doctrine
of the separation of powers under the state constitution. State v.
Mechem, 63 N. M. 250, 316 P. 2d 1069 (1957).
The uniform view held in this country at the present time is that the
legislature does not inherently possess any judicial power, Kilbourn
v. Thompson, 103 U. S. 168 (1881) ; Guy v. Hermance, 5 Cal. 73,
63 Am. Dec. 85 (1855), or any mixed jurisdiction which is partly
legislative and partly judicial. Ervine's Appeal, 16 Pa. 256, 55 Am.
Dec. 499 (1851). The doctrine as to the separation of powers of the
government into three distinct departments is considered sufficient to
prevent the legislature from exercising any judicial function what-
soever, except such as may be allowed to it by the constitution itself.
Preveslin v. Derby & A. Developing Co., 112 Conn. 129, 151 Atl. 518
(1930) ; State ex rel. Williams v. Whitman, 116 Fla. 196, 150 So.
705 (1934). It is, however, the power inherent in a government to
enact laws, within constitutional limits, to promote the order, safety,
health, morals, and general welfare of society. Providence Journal
Co. v. McCoy, 94 F. Supp. 186, 195 (D. R. I. 1950), aff'd 190 F.
2d 760 (1st Cir. 1951), cert. den. 342 U. S. 894 (1951) ; State v.
Sears, 4 Wash. 2d 200, 103 P. 2d 337 (1940). Thus while any act
by which the legislature attempts to exercise authority or usurp func-
tions properly within the scope of the judicial power is unconstitution-
al and void, State ex rel. French v. Stone, 224 Ala. 234, 139 So.
[Vol. I1I
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328 (1932); Drillon v. Industrial Accident Commission, 17 Cal. 2d
346, 110 P. 2d 64 (1941), it is within the constitutional powers of
the legislature to exercise powers judicial in their nature, where the
exercise of such powers is incident and essential to the discharge of
legislative functions. Bushnell v. Leland, 164 U. S. 684 (1897) ; Erie
R. R. v. Board, 89 N. J. L. 57, 98 Atl. 13 (1916). And in the exercise
of this power the legislature may confer quasi-judicial power on
administrative boards to effect a purpose for the public in general and
can provide that the orders of such boards are not to be overruled if
supported by substantial evidence. City of Socorro v. Cook, 24 N. M.
202, 173 Pac. 682 (1918); Floyd v. Department of Labor and
Industries, 44 Wash. 2d 560, 269 P. 2d 563 (1954). By the great
weight of authority, workmen's compensation acts are regarded as
falling within, and as a legitimate exercise of, the police powers of
the state, Mountain Timber Co. v. Washington, 243 U. S. 188
(1917); New York Cent. Ry. v. White, 243 U. S. 188 (1917), even
in the absence of express constitutional authority, Atkinson, Kier
Bros., Spicer Co. v. Industrial Commission, 35 Ariz. 48, 274 Pac.
634, 635 (1929), it being held that they diminish the likelihood that
injured workmen or their dependents will become public charges.
Board v. Abbott, 212 Ky. 123, 278 S. W. 533 (1925); Cunningham
v. Northwestern Impr. Co., 44 Mont. 180, 119 Pac. 554 (1911). And
such a contention would seem to be supported by the earlier holding
of the Supreme Court of New Mexico which says all that is required
to bring a questioned law within the proper sphere for an exercise
of the police power is that it bear a valid relationship to some per-
missible object for the exercise of that power. State v. Cleveland,
47 N. M. 230, 141 P. 2d 192 (1943); see also Mitchell v. City of
Rosewall, 45 N. M. 92, 111 P. 2d 41 (1941). The great weight of
authority also supports the view that the creation by compensation
laws of boards or commissions having authority to find facts and
make awards does not constitute an unwarranted exercise of judicial
powers or an unwarranted creation of a judicial tribunal or court.
Crowell v. Benson, 285 U. S. 22 (1932) ; State v. Mountain Timber
Co., 75 Wash. 581, 135 Pac. 645 (1917); Borgnis v. Folk Co., 147
Wis. 327, 133 N. W. 209 (1911). And provisions making the de-
cisions of the industrial board or commission in effect final as to all
questions of fact do not deprive the parties of property without due
process of law. Nega v. Chicago Rys., 317 Ill. 482, 148 N. R. 250
(1925); Helfrick v. Dahlstrom Mettallic Door Co., 256 N. Y. 199,
176 N. E. 141 (1931); Hawkins v. Bleakly, 243 U. S. 210 (1917).
1959]
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The decision of the New Mexico Court is difficult to reconcile even
with other New Mexico decisions. It is only within the public interest
that the police power of a state may be exercised, and a valid exercise
of this power prevents the assertion of rights otherwise protected by
constitutional guarantees. Thus due process guarantees are not vio-
lated by a tax on employers to support a state operated compensation
fund. Cf. Mountain Timber Co. v. Washington, supra. Nor are they
violated by a tax on the sale of tobacco devoted entirely to the support
of the aged. Cf. State v. Cleveland, supra. The majority opinion
concedes that the police power permits fact finding by administrative
agencies which directly control and regulate the activities of carriers,
public utilities, liquor dealers, barbers and many others, upholding
such actions as "quasi-judicial". Notwithstanding, they categorically
deny this power in the field of workmen's compensation. Are we then
to say that the constitutional guarantee of due process is less-sacred
than the right of individuals to have private disputes settled entirely
by the judiciary? The consequences of an affirmative answer to this
question are disasterous, for one of the principal reasons for the
creation of such a commission is to secure the benefit of special knowl-
edge acquired through continuous experience in this difficult and
complicated field. And if the review of the administrative determina-
tions is to be very broad, with the reviewing court deciding the case
de novo upon its own independent judgment, the commission is turned
into little more than a media for the transmission of evidence to the
court and the values of adjudication of fact by experts or specialists
in the field are destroyed.
This decision is a striking example of what Justice Cardozo re-
ferred to as the dangers of "conceptualistic jurisprudence". Perhaps
these words of justice Frankfurter best illustrate the proper approach
to the doctrine of the separation of powers: The "practical demands
of government preclude its doctrinaire application" for "we are deal-
ing with what Madison called a 'political maxim' and not a technical
rule of law".
G. DANA SINKxiR.
EVIDENCE - Use of Wiretap Evidence in State Courts. - The
,defendant was indicted for bookmaking upon evidence produced by
recordings made pursuant to wiretap orders issued under New York
Code of Criminal Procedure. HELD: Benanti v. United States,
355 U. S. 96 (1957), requires the dismissal of a bookmaking indict-
[Vol. I I
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ment based on evidence obtained by wire tapping. People v. Dinan,
172 N. Y. S. 2d 496 (1958).
Under common law, the fact that evidence was illegally obtained
is not grounds for excluding it. 20 Am. JuR., Evidence §§ 393-402;
8 WiGmOR, EvnDxct §§ 2183-2184b (3d ed. 1940). Illegally obtain-
ed evidence is not admissible in a federal court where such evidence
was obtained by unlawful search and seizure. Weeks v. United
States, 232 U. S. 383 (1914). As the rule is generally stated, federal
courts will not accept evidence illegally obtained by federal officers,
the rule being one of extrinsic policy designed to prevent federal
officers from violating Fourth Amendment rights. See e. g., 8 WIG-
-moR, EvnDtNct § 2184 (3d ed. 1940). Evidence obtained by a state
officer by means which would constitute an unlawful search and seizure
under the Fourth Amendment to the federal constitution is admissible
in a state court. Wolf v. Colorado, 338 U. S. 25 (1949).
Wire tapping is not an illegal search and seizure. Olmstead v'.
United States, 277 U. S. 438 (1928). In 1934, Congress enacted the
Communications Act which provides, ". . . no person not being au-
thorized by sender shall intercept any communications and divulge or
publish the existence, contents, substance, purport, effect, or meaning
of such intercepted communication to any person." 47 U. S. C. § 605.
In construing this statute the U. S. Supreme Court has held the
statute applicable to federal officers and has excluded wiretap evidence
obtained by such officers. Nardone v. United States, 302 U. S. 379
(1937). Intrastate as well as interstate communications are protected
from disclosure in federal courts where interception is made under
direction of federal officers. Weiss v. United States, 308 U. S. 321
(1939).The Communications Act does not require the exclusion of
wiretap evidence in state courts. Schwartz v. Texas, 344 U. S. 199
(1952).
Evidence illegally obtained by unlawful search and seizure is admis-
sible in New York state courts. People v. Defore, 242 N. Y. 13, 150
N. E. 585 (1926). Wire tapping is illegal in New York. Ex parte
orders can be issued by judges to allow wire tapping to obtain evi-
dence of a crime. CONSTITUTION or NiW YORKc, ART. 1 § 12; Nzw
YORK COD ov CRIMINAL PRocupE, § 813a. The United States
Supreme Court has affirmed a case in which the New York Court of
Appeals held evidence obtained under the New York wiretap statute
admissible in a state court. People v. Stemmer, 298 N. Y. 728, 83
N. E. 2d 141, aff'd, 336 U. S. 963 (1949). Subsequently the United
States Supreme Court has held that evidence obtained by state law
enforcement officers through wire tapping authorized by state statute
6
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is inadmissible in federal court where such evidence is in violation of
the Federal Communications Act. Included in the opinion was dicta
which held state statutes allowing wire tapping, which is in violation
of 47 U. S. C. § 605, invalid. Benanti v. Unitcd States, 355 U. S. 96
(1957). Following the Benanti decision in a memorandum issued by
the Supreme Court, Special Term, New York County, Justice Hof-
stadter held, ". . . all wiretaps, whether 'authorized' or not are illegal;
and hence, any application for order 'authorizing' interception of tele-
phone messages within New York must be denied, notwithstanding
Criminal Procedure Code section providing therefor." Matter of
Interception of Telephone Communications, 170 N. Y. S. 2d 84
(1958). The court in the instant case goes beyond this and holds
evidence so obtained inadmissible in the state court.
Query: What was the intent of Congress in passing § 605 of the
Communications Act? Before the Benanti decision it appeared to be
a federal rule of evidence. Except for a brief period during 1940,
every Attorney General since the Communications Act was enacted
has favored and adhered to the position of authorized wire tapping
by federal officers in certain cases. Brownell, The Public Security and
Wire Tapping, 39 CoRN. L. Riv. 195 (1954). The court in the Benanti
decision held that 47 U. S. C. § 605 is not a mere rule of evidence and
construed the statute to prevent states from legislating to violate the
specific wording of the Act. Since Gibbons v. Ogden, 9 Wheat. 1
(U. S. 1824), it has been firmly established that when Congress acts
within its delegated powers, such acts become the supreme law of the
land.
Clearly the Benanti case holds the New York wiretap statute invalid
and any such orders issued would be in violation of 47 U. S. C. § 605.
But, does the Benanti decision hold that such evidence so obtained
would be inadmissible in a state court? If so, it would be overruling
Schwartz v. Texas, supra. No indication of such holding is apparent
in reading the Benanti decision. The question yet to be answered by
the courts of New York is whether illegally obtained wiretap evidence
will be admissible in New York state courts under the rule of People
v. Defore, supra. This question will not have to be answered if Con-
gress will pass legislation showing the intent of 47 U. S. C. § 605.
Legislation was introduced in the United States Senate in the 85th
Congress (S. 3013) to amend 47 U. S. C. § 605 to authorize wire
tapping in compliance with state laws such as the New York wiretap
statute.
E. W. LANEY.
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